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Abstract We quickly approach a “pervasive future” where pervasive computing
is the norm. In this scenario, humans are surrounded by a multitude of heteroge-
neous devices that assist them in almost every aspect of their daily routines. The
realization of this future demands strong authentication guarantees to ensure that
these devices are not abused and that their users are not endangered. However,
providing authentication for these systems is a challenging task due to the high
heterogeneity of pervasive computing applications. This heterogeneity makes it
unfeasible to propose a single authentication solution for all of the pervasive com-
puting applications. In this paper, we review several pervasive application scenar-
ios and promising authentication methods for each. To do this, we first identify
the key characteristics of each pervasive application scenario. Then, we review
the strengths and weaknesses of prominent authentication methods from the liter-
ature. Finally, we identify which authentication methods are well suited for each
application scenario based on the identified characteristics. Our goal is to provide
promising directions to be explored for authentication in each of these scenarios.
Keywords: Pervasive Computing · Security · Authentication.
1 Introduction
Pervasive computing, or ubiquitous computing, denotes a paradigm where users are
surrounded by computing elements and sensors attached to all sorts of everyday ob-
jects [48]. This enables a series of new and ubiquitous applications that impact every
aspect of users’ day-to-day routine [7]. Figure 1 shows an example of pervasive comput-
ing in the context of vehicular networks. In this case, the computing elements (vehicles,
road infrastructure, and even the user’s personal devices) interoperate to improve traffic
efficiency and safety, sometimes even without the users noticing (c.f. Section 2.2).
This “pervasive future”, however, brings forth a series of security concerns [27,32].
In this scenario, computing elements are ubiquitous and often track every aspect of users
daily routines. This means devices have access to vast amounts of sensitive information
about its users, which, in turn, raises privacy concerns [22, 51]. Besides, the rapidly
growing number of devices in these systems mean these networks will be massively
larger than other networks, meaning adversaries have several more targets to exploit.
A good example on the risk of leaving these systems unprotected is the recent Mirai
botnet attack [5].
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Figure 1. Example of pervasive computing in the context of vehicular networks.
Notably, authentication is a critical security property for pervasive computing sys-
tems. Authentication ensures that devices can verify the header (source authentication)
and content (data authentication) of messages received [52]. This forms the basis for se-
cure communication channels, since it allows devices to trust messages exchanged. In
a pervasive system, authentication allows devices to safely communicate and cooperate
to provide their intended applications.
Providing authentication in this complex pervasive scenario, however, is a chal-
lenging task [39]. Most of all, because of the heterogeneity of the network. Providing a
single authentication solution that fits the needs of each of these applications is an un-
feasible task. Most notably, the heterogeneity and peculiarities of these systems render
traditional solutions inadequate and, therefore, call for novel solutions tailored for these
systems.
In this paper, we perform a study of different pervasive application scenarios and au-
thentication solutions. We first review several pervasive computing applications, high-
lighting their main particularities and their impact on security solutions. We then review
several authentication solutions that are promising for the devices and applications often
found in pervasive computing. Finally, we identify promising combinations of applica-
tion scenarios and authentication solutions, as well as open challenges and limitations
of current approaches for each specific scenario.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the different applications we
consider in this paper. Section 3 presents existing authentication strategies. Section 4
identifies promising authentication directions for each application scenario. Finally, in
Section 5 we present our concluding remarks.
2 Pervasive Computing Scenarios
The essence of pervasive computing is that computing elements are coupled to every-
day objects in order to allow them to communicate and interoperate to provide applica-
tions [48]. Pervasive computing enables applications for almost every aspect of users’
daily routines. In this section, we present the most prominent pervasive application sce-
narios and review their particularities for security solutions.
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensors Networks (WSNs) comprises a broad spectrum of pervasive comput-
ing where the computing elements are sensors distributed in an wide area to monitor
physical and environmental conditions [2]. These sensors are often linked to a base sta-
tion to which they report the sensed data [1, 31]. Applications of WSNs vary greatly
based on what is being sensed and where, for instance, sensors may be deployed in
crops to monitor humidity and soil conditions or throughout a city to monitor its levels
of air pollution [6].
There are several limitations to the development of authentication solutions for
WSNs [34]. First, sensors are often severely resource-constrained [34] and have no
sustainable power source [56]. This means authentication solutions for WSNs must be
lightweight, so that computations can be done in a timely manner and with minimal
impact to the sensors lifespan. Besides, sensors are often deployed in unsupervised en-
vironments, which makes it easier for adversaries to physically access the device and
attempt to physically extract information (including cryptographic material) from the
device [40]. On the other hand, one powerful advantage of WSNs is that sensors are all
bootstrapped in the base station before being deployed [1]. This facilitates the deploy-
ment of cryptographic material inside the sensor.
2.2 Vehicle-to-Everything
As its name suggests, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) comprises the communication be-
tween vehicles and any other interlocutor [4]. V2X encompasses communication pat-
terns like Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V or VANETs), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure or Vehicle-
to-Roadside (V2I or V2R), Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), and Vehicle-to-Device (V2D).
V2X applications can be classified into (i) safety applications, (ii) entertainment appli-
cations, (iii) efficiency applications [26]. Examples of the former include forward colli-
sion warning, electronic emergency brake lights, and wrong way driving warning [26].
Entertainment applications include media streaming, car to car messaging, and local
touristic information [41]. The latter refers to applications like congestion control, im-
proved location systems, and improved route planning [8]. Finally, V2X is also the
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cornerstone for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), which are expected to greatly
improve public transportation services [29].
There are several complications to the design of authentication solutions for V2X [43,
54]. The first is the vehicles’ high-speed mobility, which means applications are very
time sensitive and, therefore, authentication must incur in minimal time overhead [43].
The second is the network’s massive size, VANETs are likely to be one of the largest
mobile ad hoc networks [43], this imposes burdens in the deployment and management
of cryptosystems and incurs in computational overheads as it means vehicles will have
to authenticate several other nodes in the network [30]. Third, V2X suffer from inter-
mittent connectivity as vehicles’ will sometimes move to areas without connectivity
like highways or rural areas [43], which means solutions cannot rely on a central entity
available at all times to manage the cryptosystem. Finally, privacy is a major concern in
V2X as information about the driver’s identity or location may facilitate the action of
adversaries and put the driver at risk [21]. Despite the above complications, V2X net-
works present some advantages over other scenarios. The first being that vehicles carry
a rechargeable battery, meaning energy overheads are not a serious concern. Another
advantage is that vehicles are not severely resource-constrained, meaning they can af-
ford to run more expensive cryptographic algorithms, especially for applications that
are not time sensitive [43].
2.3 Smart Homes
As its name suggests, Smart Homes refers to scenarios where devices are coupled to
common household objects, like existing smart home appliances. The main goal of
smart home applications is to provide functionalities to automate or facilitate aspects of
the user’s domestic routine. Example of applications include remotely controlled smart
lightbulbs1 and smart thermostats 2. Users have a very active role in smart home envi-
ronments. Most of the times, users are directly responsible for managing and activating
the applications (e.g., turning on the lightbulbs or adjusting the room’s temperature).
This contrasts with other scenarios, like V2X, where devices often act on their own
(e.g. a vehicle decides to brake when it anticipates an accident).
The direct involvement of the user with the IoT devices, especially requiring that
users set up the devices, directly impacts authentication solutions. That is because au-
thentication solutions for smart homes must then be seamless and easy to set up. Oth-
erwise, they risk annoying the users to the point where users simply drop or undermine
security for the sake of easier use [51]. At the same time, however, the involvement of
users also enables new functionalities or even communication channels as humans may
participate in the authentication process [37].
Another key component in smart home environments is the heterogeneity of de-
vices. Domestic IoT devices may range from powerful smartphones and tablets to
resource-constrained smart lightbulbs and door locks. This heterogeneity complicates
the proposal of novel authentication solutions, as the solutions must be simultaneously
fit for widely different devices. On the other hand, the presence of powerful devices
1 http://www2.meethue.com/
2 https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nest-thermostat/
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in the network facilitate authentication solutions, since expensive operations can some-
times be offloaded to these devices [37].
Finally, there are a couple of other advantages for authentication solutions in smart
homes. First, devices are directly connected to a power source, which makes energy
efficiency less of a concern, although still desirable. Second, smart homes are often
controlled environments with difficult access for adversaries, which means physical
attacks are less likely.
2.4 Wearables and Implanted Medical Devices
Wearable and Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs) are devices that are attached to the
user’s body [46, 53]. Although there is a fundamental difference in purpose between
Wearables and IMDs, we grouped these two scenarios together due to their similarities
for authentication. The core idea in this scenario is that devices are attached to users
bodies and they attempt to insert the user himself as a component in the pervasive
paradigm [53]. These devices also act as body sensors, monitoring physical conditions
like body temperature, movement, and health conditions (e.g. heartbeats) [46].
Because of the amount of sensitive information stored in these devices, privacy
is a paramount concern [42]. Illegitimate access to these devices allow adversaries to
access the user’s private information (e.g., emails, messages), body conditions (e.g.,
temperature, movement), and even monitor medical conditions (e.g., presence of pace-
makers) [42, 46]. At the same time, these devices often have low computational power
and rely on other, more powerful, devices to perform computations [20].
There are a few similarities between Wearables/IMDs and previous application sce-
narios. For instance, similar to sensors in WSNs, these devices have low computational
power and they also have no sustainable energy source, although wearable devices can
be more easily recharged. Besides, as it happens in smart home environments, these de-
vices sometimes require direct user involvement, which concurrently brings new chal-
lenges and possibilities for these applications. These devices can also rely on the pres-
ence of other powerful devices (to which they report data) to perform heavier operations
and are often in very controlled environments (worn by the users or attached to their
bodies), which complicates the action of adversaries.
Unlike previous applications, however, Wearables and IMDs are constantly in con-
tact with the user’s body. This creates possible new venus for authentication, based on
the user’s physical information. For instance, a pacemaker can use information about
the heartbeat to authenticate [46], while fitness trackers can use gait recognition [19]
for authentication.
2.5 Cyber-Physical-Human Systems
Cyber-Physical-Human Systems (CPHSs) is a rendezvous between cyber systems, the
physical world, and human beings. Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPSs) refer to the integra-
tion of the cyber and physical worlds [33]. CPHSs, in turn, put people in the loop by
making them not only a user of CPSs but also part of them [55]. CPHSs applications are
highly diverse, including cyber-physical medical systems, critical infrastructure control,
workspace automation, among many others [16]. The broad definition of CPHS may
6 Artur Souza et al.
Table 1. Promising authentication methods for IoT application scenarios.
Device
Heterogeneity
Power
Supply
Controlled
Environment
User
Interaction
Network
Size
WSN X X
V2X X X
Smart Homes X X X X
Wearables / IMD X X X X
CPHS X X
even include vehicular systems or wearable devices [16, 33], although in this work we
consider these as different applications.
The high diversity of CPS, and consequently CPHS, make the conception of authen-
tication solutions a challenge since resources in one context may not be available in oth-
ers. However, there are two characteristics that are staple for CPHS. First of all, humans
are directly involved in CPHS applications, for instance, the workers in a workspace or
the doctors in cyber-physical systems [49]. Further, CPHS aim at integrating the cy-
ber and physical worlds, meaning environmental conditions will always be a central
piece of these systems. The integration of characteristics of the physical world in the
authentication is a promising venue for CPHS.
2.6 Summary
Table 1 shows a summary of the common constraints for authentication solutions and
pervasive computing applications. We add checkmarks to the constraints that affect
each application scenario. We note that, since there is great variety in CPHS applica-
tions, there might be exceptions to each constraint, but we focus on the constraints that
are more frequent or more impactful. For instance, some CPHS may not have to worry
about resource-constrained devices, but ideally the authentication solution would sup-
port these devices for when they are present. Besides, there are some constraints that
are unique to certain application scenarios and, thus, we do not add them to the table.
This does not mean these constraints are any less important, for instance, mobility is a
key factor in V2X (and maybe wearables/IMD), but is not common in any of the other
application scenarios.
The columns in the table refer to the most frequent constraints from our analysis
in the preceding subsections. Device Heterogeneity refers to the presence of devices
with greatly varied computing resources. Usually, this means interoperation between
resourceful and resource-constrained devices. One classic example is the interaction be-
tween constrained sensors and resourceful base stations in WSNs. Power Supply means
devices are usually connected to a power source and, thus, energy efficiency is not nec-
essarily a concern (although often desirable). For instance, appliances in smart homes
will likely be constantly connected to power outlets. Controlled Environment means
devices are deployed in controlled environments, where it is harder for adversaries to
physically access devices without getting caught. This is the case for Wearables and
especially IMDs, which are almost always connected to the user’s body. User Inter-
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action means human users will directly interact with the devices. For instance, users
may be required to manually bootstrap devices in smart homes, thus, security solutions
should have user experience in mind (c.f. Section 2.3). Finally, Network Size means the
networks may contain a massive number of devices interoperating and, thus, authentica-
tion solutions have to be scalable. For instance, vehicles in V2X may easily surpass the
millions in a single country (e.g., until 2017, there were almost 300 millions vehicles in
the United States3), all managed in the top-level by some sort of government agency.
3 Authentication Methods
There are several different methods for achieving authentication of users and data. Each
of these methods has its own advantages and disadvantages, which makes it more or
less suitable for each application scenario. In this section, we review some of the most
prominent authentication methods in the literature.
3.1 Digital Signature Algorithm
As a baseline for comparison for the other authentication mechanisms, we first present
the traditional digital signature algorithm (DSA) [36]. The DSA is one of the most
widespread authentication solutions in traditional authentication solutions. For instance,
DSA is supported by the TLS/SSL security protocols.
Despite its widespread use, the combination of digital certificates and the DSA in-
curs high computational overheads [38, 52]. The DSA is expensive in time and storage
(large signature and key sizes), while digital certificates incur in high communication,
storage, and management overheads, especially in big networks [38]. The cost of this
solution renders it inadequate for most pervasive computing applications [52]. Still, a
few authentication solutions using DSA have been proposed [43].
3.2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a more viable alternative
to the traditional DSA [28]. The ECDSA is much more efficient in both storage and
computation than the traditional DSA as it requires smaller parameters to sign and the
signature generation is significantly faster [38]. The ECDSA still requires a certification
method, like traditional digital certificates.
To avoid the high costs of digital certificates, Brown et al. have proposed a novel
certification scheme for ECDSA called Implicit certificates [13]. The main idea behind
implicit certificates is that the user’s public key and its certificate are combined in a
single element, called the public key reconstruction data. Implicit certificates are con-
siderably smaller and faster to verify than traditional certificates [13].
3 https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-
1990/
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3.3 Short Signatures
The Boneh-Lynn-Shacham short signature scheme (BLS) [11] is a certificate-based sig-
nature scheme that generates signatures that are much shorter than DSA and ECDSA
signatures [38]. The small size of the signatures generated is the main strength of BLS.
Another interesting aspect of BLS is that its computational overhead is asymmetric: ver-
ifying signatures is much more expensive than generating them. This makes BLS well-
suited for applications where signatures are generated by resource-constrained devices
but verified by powerful devices (e.g. Section 4.1). These signatures are still certificate-
based, however, meaning they suffer from the complexity and high overhead of digital
certificates.
3.4 Identity-Based Cryptography
The idea behind Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) was first proposed by Shamir [50],
but was only made possible with the advent of pairing-based cryptography (PBC) [10].
The key idea of IBC is that user’s keys can be directly derived directly from the user’s
identity in the system (e.g., his email address). This means the user’s key is intrinsically
bound to the user, which, in turn, dismisses the need for other certification methods
like digital or implicit certificates. Since IBC dismisses certification, the cryptosystem
incurs lower storage and communication overheads and simplifies key management.
IBC, however, is not a panacea. In IBC, private keys are not generated by their re-
spective owners but rather by a Private Key Generator (PKGs), a central entity in the
cryptosystem. This means the PKG must be trustworthy, since it is able to impersonate
any user in the system [17]. This is the well-known key escrow problem of identity-
based systems. Besides, the centralized key generation creates a big vulnerability in the
system if the PKG is compromised. At last, bilinear pairings, the mathematical foun-
dation of IBC, are computationally expensive to compute, consequenly, so are crypto-
graphic operations in IBC.
3.5 Certificateless Schemes
The Certificateless scheme [3] was proposed as a middle ground between IBC and
traditional Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). The cryptosystem is similar to IBC in that
it dismisses certification schemes. But, it avoids the key escrow problem by splitting
the key generation between the user and a central authority in the cryptosystem. The
main advantage of Certificateless is that keys can be easily shared and verified, without
the key escrow problem. One drawback of the Certificateless approach, however, is that
public keys can no longer be easily derived from the user’s identity like in IBC. Instead,
public keys must be explicitly made public by their owners. Besides, Certificateless is
also based on expensive bilinear pairings [37].
3.6 Attribute-Based Cryptography
Attribute-Based Cryptography (ABC) [24], is an extension of IBC that focuses on at-
tributes instead of identities. In ABC, users’ keys are derived from a set of attributes
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they possess, rather than their identifier. In this setup, users no longer sign messages
to prove their identities, instead, users prove they possess a set of attributes from the
system. ABC is particularly well-suited for access-control policies, especially attribute-
based access control [39, 57]. As an extension of IBC, however, ABC also suffers from
the key escrow problem and bilinear pairings.
3.7 Hash-Based Signatures
Hash-Based Signatures (HBSs) are signature schemes based solely on cryptographic
hash functions [15, 45]. HBSs have gained a lot of attention in the last decade because
of their high efficiency and resistance to quantum cryptanalysis [9]. HBSs are often
classified into two categories: One-Time Signature schemes (OTS) [25] and Multi-Time
Signature schemes (MTS) [14]. As their name suggests, in OTS private keys can only
be used to sign messages once and must then be renewed, while in MTS, private keys
can be used to sign a large, but still limited, number of messages before being renewed.
The need for constantly renewing private keys can become a burden in HBS solutions.
Another disadvantage of HBSs is that they also require some form of certification, much
like DSA and ECDSA. Unlike ECDSA, however, there is no cheaper certification alter-
natives for HBS and, thus, they rely on expensive digital certificates.
3.8 Group Signatures
In group signature schemes, users sign messages to prove they are a valid member
of a group, instead of proving their identity in the system [18]. Group signatures are
always anonymous in the sense that it is not possible for other users to know who
generated a signature. In these schemes, a group manager is responsible for generating
and distributing keys to other users in the system. The group manager is also responsible
for adding or removing users from the group. Unlike the other members of the group,
the group manager is able to “open” a signature to reveal its signer. This is used to
identify and remove malicious users in the group.
Group signatures have the clear advantage of being anonymous and simple, as each
user need only know the group generation and verification keys. However, there is sig-
nificant overhead for the group manager to manage the devices, especially if the group
is highly dynamic. Also, since all devices use the same group key, a single device that
is compromised means the entire group must be redone.
3.9 Ring Signatures
Ring signatures are an extension of group signature schemes [44]. Much like in group
signature schemes, users sign messages as one of the members of a group of users.
However, in ring signature schemes, the group need not be truly formed and the other
users need not even be aware of the group. The user may simply choose any set of users
and sign a message as one of the users in the set.
There are two main differences between group signatures and ring signatures. The
first is that ring signature schemes do not need group managers since the groups are
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formed by the user himself when generating the signature. The second is that, since
there is no group manager, no one is able to trace back the generator of a signature,
therefore the signatures are completely anonymous.
Ring signatures are interesting replacements for group signatures for scenarios where
there is no suitable candidate for the group manager or when groups are difficult to form.
One drawback of ring signatures, however, is that they require a previous set up of pub-
lic/private key pairs and the efficiency of the ring signature depends on the underlying
cryptosystem [44].
3.10 Mesh Signatures
Mesh signatures are an extension of Ring Signatures [12]. Similar to its precursor, mesh
signatures allow users to sign a message anonymously, providing only a list of possible
signers. Mesh signatures, however, possess two differences when compared to ring sig-
natures. First, mesh signatures allow any individual to be included in the list of possible
signers, even if the user real public key of the user is unknown. Second, mesh signatures
provide threshold signing. That is, messages may be signed as a subset of members of
the group of possible signers.
One drawback of mesh signatures, however, is that it enables users to collude to
generate signatures that each of the users alone would not be able to generate [35]. This
could allow users to collude to bypass certain system conditions or to satisfy signer
requirements [35]. For example, a computer science student could collude with an en-
gineering professor to sign a message as a computer science professor.
3.11 Physical Signatures
Physical signatures are signatures based on features of the physical world. These sig-
natures are strong complements to cryptographic schemes in applications where there
is constant interaction with the physical world [55]. These signatures can be either in-
trinsic or extrinsic, depending on how they are generated [55]. Intrinsic signatures are
generated from inherent characteristics from devices, channels, or the physical environ-
ment [23]. For instance, Wu et al. [23] have proposed authenticating media through the
Electric Network Frequency (ENF) of the place where the media was recorded. Extrin-
sic signatures, on the other hand, are signals and data that are intentionally injected and
monitored in a system. For instance, physical-layer watermarks [47].
4 Authentication for Pervasive Computing Applications
In this section, we highlight promising authentication methods for each of the appli-
cation scenarios presented in Section 2. Table 2 summarizes what we consider to be
interesting approaches for each scenario. Note, however, that these are based on the
presented characteristics for each application scenario and authentication method. Nat-
urally, even if an authentication method seems ill-suited for a particular application, it
might be possible to come up with a viable authentication solution with it.
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Table 2. Promising authentication methods for IoT application scenarios.
ECDSA IBC Certificateless ABC HBS Group Ring Mesh Physical BLS
WSN X X
V2X X X X
Smart Homes X X X
Wearables X X X X X
CPHS X X
4.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
The biggest impediment on authentication for WSNs are the inherent resource con-
straint of the sensors. This means authentication solutions must rely on methods that
require low computing resources, low bandwidth, and low energy consumption. These
requirements, coupled with the presence of the resourceful base station and previous
bootstrapping process, make BLS an interesting alternative. Likewise, group signatures
are a natural fit for WSNs, with the base as the group manager. However, the physical
vulnerabilities of the sensors are a drawback for group signatures, since compromising
a single sensor would lead to the entire group being compromised. One way to mitigate
this issue is to use secure hardware modules [40].
4.2 Vehicle-to-Everything
There are several complications to V2X communications. For the most part, the major
complication is the combination of high mobility, time-sensitive applications, and mas-
sive network size. This means vehicles must be able to very quickly authenticate several
other vehicles in its vicinity. The added privacy requirements complicate design even
further, as it means anonymous signature schemes are required.
Group signatures are not well suited for V2X applications, because the group man-
ager would have to be one of the vehicles, which leads to trust concerns, and because
the high mobility of vehicles would cause the group to change frequently. Ring sig-
natures or mesh signatures are a better fit, since they do not require a group manager.
Besides, vehicles would be able to sign messages as one of a group of vehicles in the
vicinity, therefore protecting their privacy. Mesh signatures also have the added benefit
of allowing threshold signatures, which would allow vehicles to group up to endorse
information and naturally preventing adversaries from spreading false information.
Another possible solution for V2X is ABC. In ABC, a vehicle could have a set of
attributes that qualify it as a valid vehicle in the system, ensuring it can authenticate its
own information without revealing its identity. ABC comes with the extra benefit of not
allowing vehicles to collude and provides a simple framework to enable the deployment
of vehicles with special characteristics, like emergency services, public transportation,
or public service vehicles.
4.3 Smart Homes
The relaxed requirements of smart home environments facilitate the development of
authentication solutions. Solutions need not be extremely efficient (except maybe for
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a handful of devices), networks are small, and applications are not time sensitive. Be-
sides, the controlled environment and the direct involvement of users may enable novel
solutions. HBS, is an interesting option for the resource-constrained devices of smart
homes, especially since there are resourceful devices to handle the constant key gener-
ation. ABC is another interesting option, as it allows intuitive and fine-grained access
control to devices, even among members of the household [37]. IBC, Certificateless,
and ECDSA are all also viable for smart homes, given the lax requirements of these
applications, however, without the added benefits of HBS’s high efficiency or ABC’s
fine-grained access control.
4.4 Wearables
The biggest challenge of authenticating wearable devices is their resource constraint
and limited power supply. This means authentication solutions for these devices must
be highly efficient. On the other hand, the periodic contact of these devices with other,
more resourceful devices, enables solutions like HBS. The high efficiency of HBS
makes them suitable for resource-constrained devices and the periodic contact with
resourceful manager devices allow the keys to be easily renewed. Wearables also have
frequent access to biometric or environmental information. This makes context-aware
authentication solutions like physical signatures an interesting option.
4.5 CPHS
It is complicated to propose a single authentication solution for CPHS given the very
heterogeneous nature of its applications. But, there are a few staple features in CPHS
system that hint at promising approaches. In particular, the constant involvement of
the physical world makes physical signatures a viable, and interesting, authentication
method. Naturally, this does not mean other authentication methods are ill-suited for
CPHS. ABC may be interesting for automated workspaces, since access control can
be implemented for each worker based on his attributes within the company hierar-
chy. More traditional approaches with simple certification schemes like IBC, certifi-
cateless or even ECDSA may also be viable where devices are not severely resource-
constrained. For instance, in critical infrastructure systems where devices are resource-
ful and it is important to know who is signing messages for auditing purposes.
5 Conclusion
Computing is quickly becoming more pervasive, creating a demand for stronger secu-
rity solutions. In particular, authentication solutions tailored for pervasive applications
are paramount, yet they remain an open challenge. In this paper, we reviewed notewor-
thy scenarios where pervasive computing is quickly establishing itself and indicated
promising authentication approaches for each. We first identified the peculiarities of
each application scenario as well as the main strengths and weakness of each authen-
tication method. We then identified which authentication methods are well-suited for
each scenario based on the peculiarities of each.
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